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Plaintiffs, 
- VS -
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, 
as Administrator of the State Insurance Fund, 
Defendant, 
BRIEF OF 
NA'l1URE OF 'l1HE CASE 
Case No. 
11753 
Plaintiffs claim an amount of money from Defend-
ant, Utah State Department of Fjnanre, Administrator 
of the State Insurance Fund, which represents Defend-
ants share of costs and attorneys fees in Third Party 
lawsuits brought under the provisions of Sec. 35-1-62 
Ptah CodP Ann. (Repl. Vol. 1966). 
2 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Plaintiffs received judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of Lower Courts judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The claims of all of the plaintiffs have the following 
factors in common : 
Plruntiffs received on-the-job injuries. 
Plaintiffs requested and received compensation pay-
ments from defendant, Utah State Insurance Fund. 
Plaintiffs pressed claims against "third parties" as 
provided in Sec. 35-1-62 Utah Code Ann. (Repl. Vol. 
1966). 
Plaintiffs received compensation of the third party 
claims. 
Plaintiffs reimbursed the defendant for the com-
pensation it had paid. 
3 
Defendant did not pay any portion of the attorneys' 
fees or court costs incurred by plaintiffs in their "third 
party'' claims. 
At the time the defendant \Vas reimbursed, plain-
tiffs' attorneys protested the payment indicating that 
defendant should be required to pay a portion of the 
attorneys' fees and court costs. 
All of the above events took place prior to the Utah 
Supreme 1Court decision in the case of TV.orthen vs. Shurt-
leff and AndrPws, Inc., 19 Utah 2d 80, 426 P. 2d 223. 
At the time the above events took place, the Utah 
Supreme Court case of McConnell vs. Commission of 
Finance, 13 Utah 2d 395 375 P. 2d 394. enunciated the 
controlling law on the issued in these cases, i.e., the 
compensation carrier was not required to pay a portion 
of the attorneys' fees and court costs of "third party 
:wtions." 
The present suits were c01mnenced subsequent to the 
decision in TVorthen vs. Shurtleff and Andrews. Inc., 19 
l T tah 2d so, 426 p, 2d 223. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WORTHEN VS. SHURTLEFF, INC., 19 Utah 2d 80, 
426 P. 2d 223, SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETRO-
ACTIVELY. 
4 
Defendant contends that the doctrine laid down in 
the Worthen case should not be applied retroactively 
so as to require defendant to pay costs and attorneys' 
fees on cases that were settled before the Worthen case. 
The question of whether the law of a case applies 
retroactively or only prospectively is said to be an old 
and difficult one. See 20 Arn. Jur. 2d. 562, Courts Sec-
tion 233. To be sure, the overwhelming majority of 
c·ases dealing with the question are very old with the 
<'xception of a fe-w cases dealing with the application of 
cases construing constitutional rights. A few generali-
ties may be stated 'With respect to the question. First, 
retroactive generally dot's not raise a constitutional issue. 
Linklettrr 1.·s. T¥ alker, 381 U.S. 618; Tehan vs. U.S. e.r 
, cl Shott. 382 F.S. 406; Ruark vs. People, 158 Colo. 110, 
-W5 P. 2d 751. An exception to this rule is if retroactive 
t.•ffect would impair the obligations of existing contracts 
or dPstroy vPsted rights. Taylor '0S. Ypsilanti, 105 U.S. 
GO ( 15 Otto) ( 1881). Jackson vs. Harris, 43 F. 2d 513; 
Continental Supply Co. vs. Abell, 95 Mont. 148, 24 P. 2d 
133; O'Malln; rs. Simms, 51 Ariz. 155, 75 P. 2d 50. The 
<leeision of 'dwther or not to apply a decision retro-
actively is within tlle discretion of the State Court. Ree 
e.q. Great Northern R. Co. vs. Sunburst Oil amd Refining 
Co., 287 U.S. 358. As stated by 1\fr .• Justice Cordoza, 
"The choice (retroacfrye or prospective only) for any 
state may be determined hv the juristic philosophy of . . 
tlw judges of her courts, their conceptions of law, its 
orig-in and nature." Id at 365. 
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The two legal encyclopedias Am. Jur. and Corpiis 
Juris agree that the majority of state courts have held 
that decisions will be applied retroactively. See 20 Am. 
Jitr. 562, Courts Section 233; 21 CJS 326 Coitrts Sec. 
194. However, Ani. Jur. points out an execption that 
applies in cases such as the instant casP. 
"The overruling of a judicial construction of 
a statute '.vill not be given retroactive effect. Such 
a decision ''till be limited to the effect ordinarily 
inherent in a change of a statutory rule, that is, 
merely prospective 0ffect." 
:20 Am. Jur. 2d 562-563 Courts Section 234. -While this 
exception may be sufficient support for a decision m 
appellant's favor, appellant will go further. 
Tracing the history of the question of retrospective 
vs. prospective, shows that the early view was that all 
decisions had to have retroactive effect; there was no 
authority for the proposition that judicial de-cisions made 
law only for the future. Blackstone and Commentaries 
(i9 (15th ed. 1809) Norton i:s. Shell)'y County 118 U.S . 
.J-25 (1886). The philosophy of most all the cases requir-
ing retroactive application is that tlw court interprets 
rather than creates the law; that an overruled decision 
should have no effect and should h<' treated as if it never 
was. See Grny, Nature and Sourc<'s of Law, 222 (1st ed. 
1909). The law was treated as if it were "a brooding 
omnipresence" and the court applies the law to 
tho facts. 
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Legal philosophers and courts recently realiz(•<l 
that such a v1ew was not very realistic and sometimes 
led to unjust results. Austin maintained that judges do, 
in fact do something more than discover hrw; they make 
it, in many instances. He advoeai('d that rather than 
be erased by a later decision, an ovenuled decision is to 
be considered a juridicial fact and cases dPciclecl nndPr 
it and relations entered into in reliance on it are not to 
be disturbed. ·Many other legal philosophers and jurists 
have espoused the same vie\\'. See, e.q. Cordoza, .. Ad-
dress 55 Rep. N.r. State Bar Ass'11, 2G3 29G-297 (1952); 
37G, at 387-388; Trny11or, Bad Lands in a Apprllate 
.T11dge's Rralni of Reason, rtah L. Rt>v. 157, 167-168, 
(1960) Bodeheimrr, Jurisprudence (19G2). Professor Ed-
ger Bodeheimer, of the University of rtah, 
College of Law faculty writes, "an unfortunatP consP-
quence of discarding a prPcedent under the still-pr<>vail-
ing doctrine is the retroactive f'ffrct of an overruling 
<1eeision. . . . R<>gardlC'ss of the theoretical question as 
to whether a judicial decision is law until such time as 
it is chang·f•d, or nwrely rehnttahle evidene<' of the law, 
it would seem perfectly sound practice for a court to 
overturn a precedent. hut refns0 to apply, on grounds 
of e11uitahle estopp<>l, thf> nPW principle (rdroactively)" 
I rl n t :17 5-37 G. 
The Austinian view started g-ain111g- arceptanct> in 
courts as early as one lrnndrecl years ago. In Ohio, 
althon.d1 lPgislatin· wf·r« lH·ld ilh·µ;al and void, 
tho:-;p alrPa<ly grantt•d W<'l'P irnrnnnizt•d l)y a prospertiv<> 
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application of the rnle of the Bingham vs. Miller, 
17 Ohio 445 (1848). The United States Supreme Court 
first drew on the Austinian concept in Gepcke vs. Du-
lmque, 1 Wall 175 (1863). They disearded the old con-
cept of required retroactivit.Y. The new theory was re-
garded favorably by Mr. Justic(• Holmes in Kithn vs. 
Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 371 (1910). Then in 
1932, Mr. Justice Cordoza speaking favorably of the 
Austinian approach denied a federal due process attack 
on a state court decision allowing prospective application 
only. Great Northern R. Co. vs. Sunbitrst Oil and Re-
fini·11g Co., 287 U.S. 358. Eight years later, Mr. Chief 
Justice Hughes reasoned that because a law was de-
tPrmined unconstitutional or a case overruled, it must 
still be considered "an operative fact and may have con-
sequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past can-
not always be erased by a new judicial declaration." 
Chicot Coitnty Drainage Dist. vs. Baxter State Bank, 
808 tT.S. :n1 (1940). 
Finally, the Supreme Court has looked with favor 
on having prospective application only. In Mossrr vs. 
Darrow, 3-1-1 U.S. 2G7, at 276, cited approvingly in Link-
lrttcr vs. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 at 628, Mr. Justice Black 
"There is rnnch to be said in fa\'Or of such a rule 
( prospectivP application for casPs arising in the 
future." 
ThP instant case might be decided in dt>fendant's 
on thP exception, noted hy Am .. h1r., that retro-
8 
activity is denied in cases dealing with construction of 
statutes. Howevt>r, the sanw result could be reached by 
re-examining the entire contro\·ersy of retroactivity vs. 
prospectivity. At this stage in tlw history of Jurispru-
dence, there can be no doubt that judges do make law; 
the law is no longer regarded as a "brooding omnipres-
ence." Inasmuch as the old theory lwhind the rule of 
retroactivity is thoroughly disc·redikd, an Pxamination 
of prospective vs. retroactive application, in light of 
more modern and rt>alistic legal philosophy is need<>d. 
If it is considered that a jndicial decision can make law, 
then we mnst consider that the case of McConnell vs. 
Commissiouer of Fi11a11CP, 13 Utah 2d 395, 375 P.2d 394 
was the law in Utah until tlw TVortheu case; and furtht•1-, 
the the McConnell case gon•rns all these cases based on 
facts taking place prior to thP TVorthe11 case. Tlrns, an 
ovPrruling precedent wonld operate mnch tlw same as a 
l<•gislative enactmf•nt. This seem:-; to lw tlw only rPalistie 
and practical approaeh. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE DOC-
TRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL. 
Equitable Pstopp<'l should apply in this case m the 
:'l:'nse that Profrssor Hod1·11ht•i111(•r disC'USSl'd it abovP. In 
1·ssPnce, the• argtlllH·llt is that tlH· d1•frJ1dant lias justi-
fiahl:-· n•li<·d on tlw Stat<· Supreme Ccurt's dPcision 
of JlcConnell 1:s. Commissioner of Fi11aJ1CI', 13 etah 2d 
375 P.:?d and dmw rn to tliPir ddriuwnt. rl1ll<' 
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Stat(• I mmranc1· Fund has not taken into consideration 
in fixing thPir premiums tJw fact that they are re-
quired to pa:· attorney's fees. As pointed out at the 
]H•aring in the lowPr court, the premimns charged to 
t•111plo:·prs hy appellant ar<' hased on the amount of 
('Ompensation paid to injured employees in a particular 
illdnstry. ] f rompen:-;ation paid ont was reimbursed in 
\rholP to appellant as result of a third-party action, then 
tlH•n' would lw no increase in prt>miurns. 'l1his was the 
vractice prior to lVortlu?11 h<'ranse the State Insurance 
F'nnd actuari<·s, in figuring rates for premiums, were 
J'Plying on thP d1•cision in JlcC011ncll i·s. Comniissioner 
1,f Fi1u111c1'. FnrtJwr. tlw Stat(' Insurance Fund is con-
to lw mad<· up of tru:;t monies, Utah State At-
!1n11e!J Ge11cral's opi11iou :Xo. G3-Ul5. Tlw failure to fol-
low the law in administering trust monies may "·ell rr-
s ult in prosPeution against dl'fendant's Pmployees, ln-
d11st rial Co111missio11 i·s. Strong, 239 Pac. 12. If we view 
the affret of thr Wort71r11 C'ase as oyerrnling JlcConndl, 
;1ml dt·C"laring it as JWV<'r !wing law, then defendant's 
r·mployP<>s failed to follow tlH· law hy refusing to pay 
fr1•:-;. This S<'<'lll to lw a rather hypo-
tlil'tical and hyprrtt•clmical int<'rpretation; however, the 
sort of situation happt>nPd in Jlossrr 1·s. Darrow, 
341 U.S. 2G7 (1951). Tlw dPfrndant, Darrow was held 
JH'rsonall:· liahlP for $4:3,000 as trustee of a reorganiza-
tion trnst. Not onl:· WPI'<' th<' acts complained of not 
eonsidf•r<>d wrongf'nl prior to the ease, but he did not 
p(']'sonall:· profit from any of th<' acts \\·hich th<' ease 
Jnw suh:-:PqlH'ntI:-· prohihifrd. .• Jnstire Rlark dissented, 
10 
stating "It seems to me, howeYer, that there is no reason 
why the rnle should he retroactively applied ... Under 
these circmnstances, if the new rule is to he announced 
by the Court, I think it should he given prospertive ap-
plieation only.'' 
'rI1e deft>nse of equitahlt> Pstoppel used in the present 
case is somewhat different than mmal. Generally, equit-
ahle estop1wl is pn•dicatPd on defendant's relianc(• on 
the conduct of the plaintiff. In this cas<', the only eon-
cluct of plaintiff's that dd<>ndant relied upon was pay-
rnent "-ith acquiesenc<>, albeit protested acquiesenc<>, in 
non participation in costs and attorney's fres. The real 
n·liance, in this case hy hoth dt>ft>ndant and plaintiffs 
was in the Ftah Snprenw Court dt>cision in tlw JlcC01111ell 
1·asP. However, this is sufficient relianr<' for the def<·nsP 
0t t•quitahle estoppel to 1m·\·<>nt rutroaetive appliration. 
llod1·1tl1eimcr, .J11ri.<i]Jnuln1ce, ::374 (19G2). 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
In its ans;\·ers to plaintiffs' <'Omplaints, the State 
Tnsurance Fnnd tlte d1•f(·nsP of statntt• of limita-
tions. The lowPr court, in its i11<·111ornndurn dPcision, lwld 
that the limitation p<'riod of R<>c. 78-12-25 U t11l1 Corle A1111. 
( applied to t]1(' instant cast'. That H•dion providPs 
a four y<>ar limitation p<•rio<l for adions upon eontrad:-;, 
11 
obligations, not foun<led upon a writing, and for services 
rendered. rrhe lower court further held that the limita-
tion period began to run from the date plaintiffs reim-
lrnrsed the State Insurance Fund. Inasmuch as all the 
<'ases consolidated in this action were begun four years 
from the date appellant -..ms reimbursed, the lower court 
held that none of plaintiff's claims were barred by the 
statntP of limitations. 
Appellant takes issue with the lower court's decision 
on this point. Appellant's liability in these cases, if any, 
is not based on a contract eitlwr expressed or implied. 
Liability is impost-d hy Sec. 35-1-62 Utah Code Ann. 
(Rq>l. Yol. 19G3), and the Ftah Supreme Court's de-
('ision in 1Vortl1en rs. Shurt.liff and Andrews, Inc., 19 
l' tali 2d 80, 42G P.2d 223, intPrpreting- that statute. If 
appellant is liahlt> to vlaintiffs lwcaust> of Sec. 35-1-62, 
tlwn tJip limitation JWriod should he that provided in 
1·ithPr SPc. 78-12-26 ( 4) or Sec. 35-1-99 Utah Code Ann. 
SPction 78-12-2G ( 4) ]H'O\'ides a thrt-e year limitation 
pt>riod for actions for liability hasPd on a state statute. 
"\notlwr limitation pf'riod, that provided in Sec. 35-
1-99 Utah Code A1111. may be applicabk That section 
Jll'o\·idPs a thr<'P yt>ar limitation for actions for compen-
sation undPr \Yorkmen's Compensation· 1aws. This lim-
itation rwriod sePms applicable inasmuch as the statute 
en·ating- th<' liability, S<'c. 35-1-G2(1) Utah Code Ann., 
is a \Y orlrnwn's Co11qwnsation statntr. 
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It might be argued that claims, such as in the instant 
case, are not claims for compensation, hut rather claims 
for attorneys foes, and, thus, the limitation period for 
work:nwn's injuries should not appl.'·· I lo\n'v('r, such 
argument fails to carry weight when it is considcrt>d 
that the fund or pool of morn'.'· from which the attorn<'.'·'s 
fees are paid is in reality tlH' amount paid for compen-
sation of injuriPs. The attorrn'y's frps i11 all thP presPnt 
cases are based on a 1wrct>ntage of tlw recovery for in-
juries and actually are d<>rived from tl1e rn01wys paid for 
the injuries. Thus, the claims in tlH' instant case are not 
for attorrn,y's ft'es, lrnt for that portion of ("Olll)H'nsation 
paid to the Stah' Insurance Fund which r<'}Jl'esPnts what 
the State Insurance Fund would have liad to pay an 
attorney to colled. A hypotlH·tical 0xample may hdp to 
illustrate the point. Assmiw, an injm('d worker receivPs 
a $30,000.00 award in a third-party claim. If th0 State 
Insurance Fund had paid out $10,000.00 in eomprnsation 
paynwnts, the workPr, hdor<' tlw TVort71e11 cas<>, would 
only p;Pt $10,000.00 of the award. 1'hP InsnrancP fnnd 
would get $10,000.00 and tlH' attorrn'.'· wot1ld get $10,-
000.00. Aft<>r Worthen, the Statr Insuranc<' Fund is n'-
quirrd to hear its portion of attonw.'·'s eosts, so now th<' 
InsuraneP Fund only r0cPiv<>s $G,GGG.OO whilr thP 
injured worker is allovYed to rPtain an additional 
or $13,334.00. rrlrns, th<· claims in tlw instant case 
nr<' not really for attonwy's fr<>s hnt for that portion of 
thr compensation award paid to tlH' RtatP lnsnrancP Ft1rnl 
\\·hich is compnt<>d on the hasis of its sharr of attorne.'·'s 
13 
frPs. If the claim is considered as a claim for additional 
C'Ompensation, then the limitation period pertaining to 
actions for compensation should apply. 
If tlw Utah Supreme Court decides that Sec. 35-1-99 
Ctah Code Ann. is the pro1wr statute of Limitations then 
tlw limitation ]Wriod should run from the date of the last 
payment to tlw worker h.Y the State Insurance Fund. If 
SPc. 78-12-2G( 4) Utah Code Ann. is considered applicable, 
then the limitation period should begin, as held in the 
lower court, from the date that payment was withheld 
by the State Insurance Fund. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS SHOULD BE DENIED FOR 
THEIR FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRA-
TIVE REMEDIES. 
The law is too well s0ttled to require citation that 
a claimant mnst exhaust administrative remedies before 
bringing his claim to court. If thP Court views the claims 
in these cases as claims for additional compensation, as 
pointed ont in the section of this hrief immediately above, 
t11P plaintiffs must first exhaust administrati,·e remedies 
L>· bringing their claim befort> the State Industrial Com-
mission. SPc. 33-1-(i() Utah Code Ann. 
Onl.'· uf1er having their claim denied by the Com-
mav thev bring their claims to Court. 
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POINT V 
PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT THE REAL PARTY IN 
INTEREST; AND THUS, THEIR COMPLAINTS 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED. 
If the Court does not view plaintiffs claims as claims 
for additional compensation, but rather as claims for 
attorney's fees, then appellant would argue that plaintiffs 
are not real party in intPrest. The question presented is 
whether the plaintiffs or their attornt-ys on tht> third-
11arty lawsuits are propt-r parties. 
The defendant, in its answer, has raised the affinna-
tive defense that the plaintiffs are not the real party in 
interest. The law is clear that a plaintiff must possess 
a right and be owed a duty before he may invoke the 
jurisdiction of the court. Wilson vs. Kiesel, 9 Utah 397, 
i35 Pac. 488; 39 Am . .Jur. 858 Partifs Section 9. This is 
particularly true with respect to statutory actions, as is 
the pn•sent casP. See Hunt vs. State, 201 N.C. 37, 158 
S.E. 703 wherein the court held, "'\Vhere a cause of action 
is given hy Statute, only tl10se 1wrsons who are grantc>d 
the cause of action may sue." 
Assuming the Statute, SPc. 35-1-62 l./tah Code .An11. 
(Repl. vol. 1966) clearly impos<:'s a duty on def Pndant to 
pay attorrn"'y's fpes, it is not clPar to whom this duty is 
ow<:'d. Defendant is obviously concerned with this point 
to prevPnt a donblP liability sitnation. In a case similar 
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to the instant case, filed in Federal District Court for 
Utah, tlw ''third party" plaintiffs' attorneys brought the 
action. See DPlbcrt 111. Draper, Jr. et. al. vs. Travelers 
I11sura11ce Co., et. al., CiYil No. C-228-67. 
11 lw fact that as alleged in plaintiffs' complaint 
plaintiffs have already paid their attorneys' fees, has no 
hearing. Tlw rPal party in interest is determined as of 
thP date the cause of action arose, c.f., Wilson vs. Kiesel, 
0 Utah 397, 35 Pac. 488; TVhitc vs. Tulsa Iron & Jletal 
Corp., 185 Okla. GOG, 95P. 2cl 590; not from the fact that 
:-:uhseqnently, plaintiffs paid their attorneys, a payment 
they may not han• been required to make. The duty 
imposed (in these cases hy statntt>) must be owed to the 
plaintiff, or tlwre can he no recovery. Huntington t:s . 
• \
1 utl. Sat:. Ba11k, 9() U.S. 388; Illinois C.R. Co. vs. Baker, 
Fi5 K :-·. :J1 1 :=i9 8. \r. 11G9. 
The :;;tatute reads " ... attorm•y's foes shall be paid 
and charg-ed against the parties ... "The 
statute plaers the bmden on both parties. The implication 
hnd most obvious construction of the statnte is that the 
may collect his fees from both parties, propor-
tionately. Tf snch is the case, plaintiff's claims should 
]ip dPniPd as arP not tlw real in interPst. 
POINT VI 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE DE-
FENSE OF LA CHES. 
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Although it may be determined that plaintiffs' claims 
are not barred by the Statute of Limitations, recovery 
may still be precluded on grounds of laches. HolmlJerg 
,,·s. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392; Alsov n;. Riker, 155 U.S. 
448; Godden vs. Kimmel, 99 F.S. 201; Tl'hitney i-s. Fox, 
166 U.S. 637. The doctrine of laches may, "when justice 
demands it, refuse relief, t>ven if the time which has 
Plapsed ... is less than prescrilwd the of 
l .. imitations." 27 Am. Jur. 2d 094 Rquity Section 157. 
Laches, frequently krmed the "doctrine of stale de-
mand" is an equitable defense based on the public policy 
considerations of preventing unreasonable, knowing, in-
jurious delay. Mocka.ll rs. Casilear, 137 U.S. 556; Hal-
stead vs. Grinnan, 152 r.S. 412. The defrnse of laches is 
i10t mandatory, but is to be applied in the sound dis-
cretion of the court. Davidson rs. Grady, 105 f. 2d 405. 
Sinclair vs. AllPnder, 238 Iowa 212, 2() N.\V. 2d 320. 
There are three requirements beforp tlw doctrine of 
}aches may be applied to preclude reCO\'Pry. rrhey are: 
Lapse of time. 
The plaintiff had knowledge of the facts g1vmg 
him a canst' of action and arnplL• opportunity 
to presPnt his claims. 
The adverse party had good iTason to believe that 
plaintiff's rights were worthless and had 
been abandonPd so that it would hP an in-
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justice to permit the plaintiff to now assert 
them. 
See 27 Arn .• htr. 2d 701-702, Eq1tity Section 162. 
There is no question that there was a delay or lapse 
of time ·with respect to all plaintiffs' claims. Although 
with respect to some of the claims, the delaY is not 
nearly so long as with others, it does appear that all 
the cases were delayed. The length of time elapsed is 
not eSSl'ntial to the defense of laches, although there has 
to appear to be some delay. Archaubmtlt vs. Sprouse, 213 
S. C. 336, 55 8. E. 2d 70. "Lapse of time is an element 
hut not the controlling factor of laches." Finucane i·s. 
Jfoydau, 8() Idaho 199, 3S4 P. 2d 236. 
On the other hand, the main e!Pnwnt of the defense 
of laches is that tlw plaintiff had knowledge of the facts 
giving rise to his eansP of action and still delayed. 
Greeley vs. Lo1)eland lrrig. Co. i:s. JI cClouglzland, 140 
Colo. 173, 342 P. 2d 104;); Jlo11ta11a Power Co. rs. Park 
Electric Corp., 1-±0 Mont. 293, 371 P. 2d 1; Morris vs. 
Ross, ;)S K.M. 379, 271 P. 2d Eqnity courts decline 
tt) assi.'-t a 1wrson who has "slept upon his rights" and 
shows no exc11sP for his laches in assPrting them. Lane 
& B Co. 'i'S. Locke, 150 U.S. 193, Speidel t'S. Henrici, 120 
LS. 377. In the present case there is no doubt plaintiffs 
had knowl('dgc> of the facts giving rise to other causes of 
action. 'rhey all dNnandt>d the defendant participate in 
tlH' att('l'lH',\'S f(•('s ::tml costs; they all said under protest, 
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and then they all slept on their rights until years later, 
after someone else had paved the way for them by appeal-
ing the Worthen case. There can be no excuse for such a 
delay. 
The final element of laches is that the defendant 
has good reason to believe that the plaintiff's rights are 
worthless, or have been abandoned. Factual support for 
the existence of this element appears from paragraph 
eleven of the complaints in cases with District Court 
numbers 186365, 183213 and 182724. In said paragraph 
plaintiffs allege a long series of continued protest against 
the defendant not paying a portion of costs and attorneys 
fees. As support, plaintiffs offered as exhibits several 
documents dated mostly in 19G4 and 1965. Defendant 
feels that such a showing without filing action for four 
to five years certainly indicates justifiable reliance that 
the plaintiffs' rights were worthless or had been aban-
doned. For support that it appeared plaintiff's rights 
were worthless, defendant offers the case of M cConnfll 
vs. Commission of Fi·nance, 13 Utah 2d 395, 375 P. 2d 394 
which was the law in Utah at the time the transactions 
took place. 
Some courts have added a further requirement to 
the defense of laches. "l1hey require a showing of detri-
ment to defendant to allow the state claim. Defendant 
has discussed the detriment in the section of this brief 
dealing with Equitable Estoppel. 
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POINT VII 
APPELLANT IS NOT REQUIRED TO PAY A POR-
TION OF THE ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
As a final argument, appellant urges the Utah Sup-
reme Court to reconsider the holding in its opinion in 
the Worthen case. Worthen vs. Shurtleff, supra was de-
cided by a closely divided court only a few years after 
llf cC01onell vs. Commission of Finance, 13 Utah 2d 395, 
375 P. 2d 394. Appellant hopes that in light of the cost 
and problems raised by Worthen, the Court may wish to 
reaffirm the strong rationale of the McConnell case. In 
support of this argument, appellant reprints below the 
State Insurance Fnnds argument in the Worthen vs. 
Shitrtleff brief. 
The issue presented in this case is the construction 
of Section 35-1-62, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which 
provides, in part, as follows: 
"If any recovery is obtained against such thi'rd per-
son it shall be disbursed as follows: 
(1) The reasonable expense of the action, includ-
ing attorney's fees, shall be paid and charged 
proportionately against the parties as their 
intf>rests may appear. 
(2) The person liable for compensation payments 
shall be reimbursed in full for all payments 
made. 
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(3) The balance shall be paid to the injured em-
ployee or his heirs in case of death, to be ap-
plied to reduce or satisf\ in full any obliga-
tion thereafter accruing against the person 
liable for compensation." (1£mphasis added) 
This statute was construed, conc<>rning the identical 
facts in this case, in McConnell vs. Commission of Fin-
ance, 13 Utah 2d 395, 375 P2d 39-±. 'l1his Court held that 
the State Insurance Fund is entitled to full reimburse-
rnt•nt for all compensation benefits paid to the plaintiff. 
The lJ.Uestion in that case, as in this case, is whether or 
not, nnder tltP circmnstances, the State Insurance Fund's 
shart> of tlH• recovery he reduced by a propor-
tionate share of the attorm•y's feps incurred in the action 
hrought by tlw injured Pmployet•. In this case and in tlw 
Ji cCo n11ell cast\ the plaintiff, while in the course and 
sco1H' of his employment, suffered personal injuries b:· 
a third party tort feasor. 1-'he Stat<' Insurance Fund, as 
compensation carriN for the plaintiff's 1o•mployer, paid 
nwdical and other com1wnsation henPfits to tlw plaintiff. 
Thereafter the:- employee, through his attorney, brongl1t 
an action against the third party tort f easor. The at-
torn('.\·s in both cas0s proseented the matter on a con-
tingPncy basis of one-fourth of the rPCovery. Subsequent 
to settlement plaintiff's counsel sPek<>d to rpcover hack 
from the State Insurance Fund one-fourth of the amount 
paid to the plaintiff's 0mplo:·ee as attorrn'!''s fees. 
35-1-62, set out above, contemplates a three ordt'r of 
priority of dishurst>nwnt, that is: (1) Expenses of the ac-
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tion, including attorney's fees shall be paid against the 
parties as their interPst may appear; (2) Of any sums 
remaining, the insurance carrier shall be reimbursed 
for compensation benefits in full; (3) The balance if any, 
should he paid to the injured employee or his heirs. 
rrhis Court has held that ·when the State Insurance 
Fnnd was not a party to the original action then it was 
not liable nor had it incurred any legal expenses. Sub 
section 2 of the statute requires that the insurance car-
rier be reimbursed in full. Therefore, the only reason-
construction that can he made is that if the Stah· 
Insurancr Fnnd was not a 1>arty to the action it must 
hr reimbursed in full. 
It is agreed that the State Insurance Fund did not 
t'mploy Edward M. Garrett and in light of this Court's 
rJast ruling was not required to in order to protect its 
interests in receiving full reimbursement. There is also 
no donbt that the State Insurance :F\md was not a 
to the original action and the ref ore attorney's fees can-
not he assessed against it under sub-section (1) of 35-
1-62. 
Through the differing statutes of sister states deal-
ing with Workmen's Compensation Laws is of different 
wording and interpretation, it is interesting to note that 
in the problem of distribution of the proceeds of a third 
party action that Utah follows the majority rule. 2 Lar-
son Workman's Compensation Law (1961), Sec. 74.32: 
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"Usually attorney's fees and expenses are de-
ducted both in priority to the employer's lien on 
the employee's rt>covery, and before there is any 
excess for the employee in the employer's re-
covery. If the snm recovered hy the employee is 
more than enough to pay attorney's fees and re-
imburse the carrier, the carrier is reimbursed in 
full, and is not required to share the legal ex-
penses involved in obtaining the recovery. In other 
words, under the usual provision, the legal ex-
penses diminish the over-all sum to which the in-
surer's claim attaches; but if it is possible to do 
so within that fund as diminshed the insurer 1s 
Pntitled to be reimbursed in full * * * " 
See also Tucker vs. Nason (Iowa), 87 N.vV. 2d 547; 
Firemen's Fimd Indemnity Co. 1/8. Batts, (N. J.) 78 A. 
2d 293. 
It is therefore, the appe11ant's position that the 
l .. ower Court's ruling allowing attorney's fees to Edward 
M. Garrett was erroneous in light of the McConnell de-
cision and in light of the reasonable interpretation of the 
statute. It is clear that the State Insurance Fund was not 
a party of this action and the reimbursement in full for 
all payments made by the State Insurance Fund. 
It is, therefore, submitted that Sec. 35-1-62 as applied 
to the facts of this case compels a reversal to the order 
entered and judgment should be entered in favor of the 
Director of Finance as a matter of law. 
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CONCLUSION" 
The decision in Worthen vs. Sh1trtleff, supra should 
not be applied retroactiYely either on grounds of equit-
able estoppel or because the Court is of the philosophy, 
it should be giYPn prospective application. If the 
Court decides that a three-year statute of limitations is 
applicable then the claims of James Allen Scott, Don 
Gerald Williams, Angelo Melo, \Vaulstine McNeely and 
\Villiam J. Roedel should be denied. All claims may be 
barred by the defense of laches. If the claim in this case 
is, in reality, a claim for compensation, then it should be 
denied for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. If 
tlw claim is for fees owing to attorneys, the plaintiffs 
are not the real party in interest and their claims should 
lw dPnied. Finally, the Court may overrule the W orthPn 
case reaffirm McConndl and deny plaintiffs' claims. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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263 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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